A

DISCOURSE

OF

GOVERNMENT

With relation to

MILITIAS.

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MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

EDINBURGH:
Printed in the Year MDCXCVIII.
LONDON, reprinted for M. COOPER, at the Globe in Pater-noster Row.
MDCCLV.

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THERE is not perhaps in human affairs any thing ſo unaccountable as the indignity and cruelty with which the far greater part of mankind ſuffer themſelves to be uſed under pretence of government. For ſome men falſly perſuading themſelves that bad governments are advantageous to them, as moſt conducing to gratify their ambition, avarice and luxury, ſet themſelves with the utmoſt art and violence to procure their eſtabliſhment: and by ſuch men almoſt the whole world has been trampled under foot, and ſubjected to tyranny, for want of underſtanding by what means and methods they

were enſlaved. For though mankind take great care and pains to inſtruct themſelves in other arts and ſciences, yet very few apply themſelves to conſider the nature of government, an enquiry ſo uſeful and neceſſary both to magiſtrate and people. Nay, in moſt countries the arts of ſtate being altogether directed either to enſlave the people, or to keep them under ſlavery; it is become almoſt every where a crime to reaſon about matters of government. But if men would beſtow a ſmall part of the time and application which they throw away upon curious but uſeleſs ſtudies, or endleſs gaming, in peruſing thoſe excellent rules and examples of government which the antients have left us, they would ſoon be enabled to diſcover all ſuch abuſes and corruptions as tend to the ruin of publick ſocieties. 'Tis therefore very ſtrange that they ſhould think ſtudy and knowledge neceſſary in every thing they go about, except in the nobleſt and moſt uſeful of all applications, the art of government.

Now if any man in compaſſion to the miſeries of a people ſhould endeavour to diſabuſe them in any thing relating to government, he will certainly incur the diſ-

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pleaſure, and perhaps be purſued by the rage of thoſe, who think they find their account in the oppreſſion of the world; but will hardly ſucceed in his endeavours to undeceive the multitude. For the generality of all ranks of men are cheated by words and names; and provided the antient terms and outward forms of any government be retained, let the nature of it be never ſo much altered, they continue to dream that they ſhall ſtill enjoy their former liberty, and are not to be awakened till it prove too late. Of this there are many remarkable examples in hiſtory; but that particular inſtance which I have choſen to inſiſt on, as moſt ſuitable to my purpoſe, is the alteration of government which happened in moſt countries of Europe about the year 1500. And 'tis worth obſervation, that though this change was fatal to their liberty, yet it was not introduced by the contrivance of ill-deſigning men; nor were the miſchievous conſequences perceived, unleſs perhaps by a few wiſe men, who, if they ſaw it, wanted power to prevent it.

Two hundred years being already paſſed ſince this alteration began, Europe has felt the

the effects of it by ſad experience; and the true cauſes of the change are now become more viſible.

To lay open this matter in its full extent, it will be neceſſary to look farther back, and examine the original and conſtitution of thoſe governments that were eſtabliſhed in Europe about the year 400, and continued till this alteration.

When the Goths, Vandals, and other warlike nations, had at different times, and under different leaders, over-run the weſtern parts of the Roman empire, they introduced the following form of government into all the nations they ſubdued. The general of the army became king of the conquered country; and the conqueſt being abſolute, he divided the lands amongſt the great officers of his army, afterwards called barons; who again parcelled out their ſeveral territories in ſmaller portions to the inferior ſoldiers that had followed them in the wars, and who then became their vaſſals, enjoying thoſe lands for military ſervice. The king reſerved to himſelf ſome demeſnes for the maintenance of his court and attendance. When this was done there was no longer any ſtanding army kept on foot, but every

every man went to live upon his own lands; and when the defence of the country required an army, the king ſummoned the barons to his ſtandard, who came attended with their vaſſals. Thus were the armies of Europe compoſed for about eleven hundred years; and this conſtitution of government put the ſword into the hands of the ſubject, becauſe the vaſſals depended more immediately on the barons than on the king, which effectually ſecured the freedom of thoſe governments. For the barons could not make uſe of their power to deſtroy thoſe limited monarchies, without deſtroying their own grandeur: nor could the king invade their privileges, having no other forces than the vaſſals of his own demeſnes to rely upon for his ſupport in ſuch an attempt.

I lay no great ſtreſs on any other limitations of thoſe monarchies; nor do I think any ſo eſſential to the liberties of the people, as that which placed the ſword in the hands of the ſubject. And ſince in our time moſt princes of Europe are in poſſeſſion of the ſword, by ſtanding mercenary forces kept up in time of peace, abſolutely depending upon them, I ſay that all ſuch

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governments are changed from monarchies to tyrannies. Nor can the power of granting or refuſing money, though veſted in the ſubject, be a ſufficient ſecurity for liberty, where a ſtanding mercenary army is kept up in time of peace: for he that is armed, is always maſter of the purſe of him that is unarmed. And not only that government is tyrannical, which is tyrannically exerciſed; but all governments are tyrannical, which have not in their conſtitution a ſufcient ſecurity againſt the arbitrary power of the prince.

I do not deny that theſe limited monarchics, during the greatneſs of the barons, had ſome defects: I know few governments free from them. But after all, there was a balance that kept thoſe governments ſteady, and an effectual proviſion againſt the encroachments of the crown. I do leſs pretend that the preſent governments can be reſtored to the conſtitution beforementioned. The following diſcourſe will ſhew the impoſſibility of it. My deſign in the firſt place is, to explain the nature of the paſt and preſent governments of Europe, and to diſabuſe thoſe who think them the ſame, becauſe they are called by the ſame names;

and who ignorantly clamor againſt ſuch as would preſerve that liberty which is yet left.

In order to this, and for a further and clearer illuſtration of the matter, I ſhall deduce from their original, the cauſes, occaſions, and the complication of thoſe many unforeſeen accidents; which falling out much about the ſame time, produced ſo great a change. And it will at firſt ſight ſeem very ſtrange, when I ſhall name the reſtoration of learning, the invention of printing, of the needle and of gun-powder, as the chief of them; things in themſelves ſo excellent, and which, the laſt only excepted, might have proved of infinite advantage to the world, if their remote influence upon government had been obviated by ſuitable remedies. Such odd conſequences, and of ſuch a different nature, accompany extraordinary inventions of any kind.

Conſtantinople being taken by Mahomet the ſecond, in the year 1453, many learned Greeks fled over into Italy; where the favourable reception they found from the popes, princes, and republicks of that country, ſoon introduced amongſt the better

ſort of men, the ſtudy of the Greek tongue, and of the antient authors in that language. About the ſame time likewiſe ſome learned men began to reſtore the purity of the Latin tongue. But that which moſt contributed to the advancement of all kind of learning, and eſpecially the ſtudy of the ancients, was the art of printing, which was brought to a great degree of perfection a few years after. By this means their books became common, and their arts generally underſtood and admired. But as mankind from a natural propenſion to pleaſure, is always ready to chuſe out of every thing what may moſt gratify that vicious appetite; ſo the arts which the Italians firſt applied themſelves to improve, were principally thoſe that had been ſubſervient to the luxury of the ancients in the moſt corrupt ages, of which they had many monuments ſtill remaining. Italy was preſently filled with architects, painters and ſculptors; and a prodigious expence was made in buildings, pictures, and ſtatues. Thus the Italians began to come off from their frugal and military way of living, and addicted themſelves to the purſuit of refined and expenſive pleaſures, as much

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as the wars of thoſe times would permit. This infection ſpread itſelf by degrees into the neighbouring nations. But theſe things alone had not been ſufficient to work ſo great a change in government, if a preceding invention, brought into common uſe about that time, had not produced more new and extraordinary effects than any had ever done before; which probably may have many conſequences yet unforeſeen, and a farther influence upon the manners of men, as long as the world laſts; I mean the invention of the needle, by the help of which navigation was greatly improved, a paſſage opened by ſea to the Eaſt-Indies, and a new world diſcovered. By this means the luxury of Aſia and America was added to that of the antients; and all ages, and all countries concurred to ſink Europe into an abyſs of pleaſures; which were rendered the more expenſive by a perpetual change of the faſhions in clothes, equipage and furniture of houſes.

Theſe things brought a total alteration in the way of living, upon which all government depends. 'Tis true, knowledge being mightily increaſed, and a great curioſity and nicety in every thing introduc-

ed, men imagined themſelves to be gainers in all points by changing from their frugal and military way of living, which I muſt confeſs had ſome mixture of rudeneſs and ignorance in it, though not inſeparable from it. But at the ſame they did not conſider the unſpeakable evils that are altogether inſeparable from an expenſive way of living.

To touch upon all theſe, though ſlightly, would carry me too far from my ſubject: I ſhall therefore content myſelf to apply what has been ſaid to the immediate deſign of this diſcourſe.

The far greater ſhare of all thoſe expences fell upon the barons; for they were the perſons moſt able to make them, and their dignity ſeemed to challenge whatever might diſtinguiſh them from other men. This plunged them on a ſudden into ſo great debts, that if they did not ſell, or otherwiſe alienate their lands, they found themſelves at leaſt obliged to turn the military ſervice their vaſſals owed them, into money; partly by way of rent, and partly by way of leaſe, or fine, for payment of their creditors. And by this means the vaſſal having his lands no longer at ſo eaſy a rate

a rate as before, could no more be obliged to military ſervice, and ſo became a tenant. Thus the armies, which in preceding times had been always compoſed of ſuch men as theſe, ceaſed of courſe, and the ſword fell out of the hands of the barons. But there being always a neceſſity to provide for the defence of every country, princes were afterwards allowed to raiſe armies of voluntiers and mercenaries. And great ſums were given by diets and parliaments for their maintenance, to be levied upon the people grown rich by trade, and diſpirited for want of military exerciſe. Such forces were at firſt only raiſed for preſent exigencies, and continued no longer on foot than the occaſions laſted. But princes ſoon found pretences to make them perpetual, the chief of which was the gariſoning frontier towns and fortreſſes; the methods of war being altered to the tedious and chargeable way of ſieges, principally by the invention of gunpowder. The officers and ſoldiers of theſe mercenary armies depending for their ſubſiſtence and preferment, as immediately upon the prince, as the former militias did upon the barons, the power of the ſword was tranferred from

from the ſubject to the king, and war grew a conſtant trade to live by. Nay, many of the barons themſelves being reduced to poverty by their expenſive way of living, took commands in thoſe mercenary troops; and being ſtill continued hereditary members of diets, and other aſſemblies of ſtate, after the loſs of their vaſſals, whom they formerly repreſented, they were now the readieſt of all others to load the people with heavy taxes, which were employed to increaſe the prince's military power, by guards, armies, and citadels, beyond bounds or remedy.

Some princes with much impatience preſſed on to arbitrary power before things were ripe, as the kings of France and Charles duke of Burgundy. Philip de Commines ſays of the latter, 'That having made a truce with the King of 'France he called an aſſembly of the e-'ſtates of his country, and remonſtrated 'to them the prejudice he had ſuſtained by 'not having ſtanding troops as that king 'had; that if five hundred men had been 'in garriſon upon their frontier, the king 'of France would never have undertaken 'that war; and having repreſented the

'miſchiefs that were ready to fall upon 'them for want of ſuch a force, he ear-'neſtly preſſed them to grant ſuch a ſum 'as would maintain eight hundred lances. 'At length they gave him a hundred and 'twenty thouſand crowns more than his 'ordinary revenue, (from which tax Bur-'gundy was exempted.) But his ſubjects 'were for many reaſons under great ap-'prehenſions of falling into the ſubjection 'to which they ſaw the kingdom of France 'already reduced by means of ſuch troops. 'And truly their apprehenſions were not 'ill-grounded; for when he had got to-'gether five or ſix hundred men at arms, 'he preſently had a mind to more, and 'with them diſturbed the peace of all his 'neighbours: He augmented the tax from 'one hundred and twenty to five hundred 'thouſand crowns, and increaſed the num-'bers of thoſe men at arms, by whom his 'ſubjects were greatly oppreſt.' Francis de Beaucaire biſhop of Metz in his hiſtory of France, ſpeaking of the ſame affair, ſays, 'That the foreſaid ſtates could not be in-'duced to maintain mercenary forces, being 'ſenſible of the difficulties into which the 'commonalty of France had brought

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'themſelves by the like conceſſion; that 'princes might increaſe their forces at plea-'ſure, and ſometimes (even when they had 'obtained money) pay them ill, to the 'vexation and deſtruction of the poor 'people; and likewiſe that kings and 'princes not contented with their antient 'patrimony, were always ready under this 'pretext to break in upon the properties 'of all men, and to raiſe what money 'they pleaſed. That nevertheleſs they gave 'him a hundred and twenty thouſand 'crowns yearly, which he ſoon increaſed 'to five hundred thouſand: but that Bur-'gundy (which was the antient dominion 'of that family) retained its antient liberty, 'and could by no means be obliged to pay 'any part of this new tax.' 'Tis true, 'Philip de Commines ſubjoins to the forecited paſſage, that he believes ſtanding forces may be well employed under a wiſe king or prince; but that if he be not ſo, or leaves his children young, the uſe that he or their governors make of them, is not always profitable either for the king or his ſubjects. If this addition be his own, and not rather an inſertion added by the preſi-dent of the parliament of Paris, who pu-

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bliſhed, and as the aforeſaid Francis de Beaucaire ſays he was credibly informed, corrupted his memoirs, yet experience ſhews him to be miſtaken: For the example of his maſter Lewis the eleventh, whom upon many occaſions he calls a wiſe prince, and thoſe of moſt princes under whom ſtanding forces were firſt allowed, demonſtrates, that they are more dangerous under a wiſe prince than any other: And reaſon tells us, that if they are the only proper inſtruments to introduce arbitrary power, as ſhall be made plain, a cunning and able prince, who by the world is called a wiſe one, is more capable of uſing them to that end than a weak prince, or governours during a minority; and that a wiſe prince having once procured them to be eſtabliſhed, they will maintain themſelves under any.

I am not ignorant that before this change, ſubſidies were often given by diets, ſtates and parliaments, and ſome raiſed by the edicts of princes for maintaining wars; but theſe were ſmall, and no way ſufficient to ſubſiſt ſuch numerous armies as thoſe of the barons militia. There were likewiſe mercenary troops ſometimes entertained by

princes who aimed at arbitrary power, and by ſome commonwealths in time of war for their own defence; but theſe were only ſtrangers, or in very ſmall numbers, and held no proportion with thoſe vaſt armies of mercenaries which this change has fix'd upon Europe to her affliction and ruin.

What I have ſaid hitherto has been always with regard to one or other, and often to moſt countries in Europe. What follows will have a more particular regard to Britain; where, though the power of the barons be ceaſed, yet no mercenary troops are yet eſtabliſhed. The reaſon of which is, that England had before this great alteration loſt all her conqueſts in France, the town of Calais only excepted; and that alſo was taken by the French before the change was thoroughly made. So that the Kings of England had no pretence to keep up ſtanding forces, either to defend conqueſts abroad, or to garriſon a frontier towards France, ſince the ſea was now become the only frontier between thoſe two countries.

Neither could the frontier toward Scotland afford any colour to thoſe princes for raiſing ſuch forces, ſince the Kings of Scot-

Scotland had none; and that Scotland was not able to give money for the ſubſiſting any conſiderable number. 'Tis true, the example of France, with which country Scotland had conſtant correſpondence, and ſome French counſellors about Mary of Guiſe, Queen dowager and regent of Scotland, induced her to propoſe a tax for the ſubſiſting of mercenary ſoldiers to be employed for the defence of the frontier of Scotland; and to eaſe, as was pretended, the barons of that trouble. But in that honourable and wiſe remonſtrance, which was made by three hundred of the leſſer barons (as much diſſatisfied with the lords, who by their ſilence betrayed the publick liberty, as with the Regent herſelf) ſhe was told, that their forefathers had defended themſelves and their fortunes againſt the Engliſh, when that nation was much more powerful than they were at that time, and had made frequent incurſions into their country: That they themſelves had not ſo far degenerated from their anceſtors, to refuſe, when occaſion requir'd, to hazard their lives and fortunes in the ſervice of their country: That as to the hiring of mercenary ſoldiers, it was a thing of great dan-

ger to put the liberty of Scotland into the hands of men, who are of no fortunes, nor have any hopes but in the publick calamity; who for money would attempt any thing; whoſe exceſſive avarice opportunity would inflame to a deſire of all manner of innovations, and whoſe faith would follow the wheel of fortune. That though theſe men ſhould be more mindful of the duty they owe to their country, than of their own particular intereſt, was it to be ſuppoſed, that mercenaries would fight more bravely for the defence of other mens fortunes, than the poſſeſſors would do for themſelves or their own; or that a little money ſhould excite their ignoble minds to a higher pitch of honour than that with which the barons are inſpired, when they fight for the preſervation of their fortunes, wives and children, religion and liberty: That moſt men did ſuſpect and apprehend, that this new way of making war, might be not only uſeleſs, but dangerous to the nation; ſince the Engliſh, if they ſhould imitate the example, might, without any great trouble to their people, raiſe far greater ſums for the maintenance of mercenary ſoldiers than Scotland could, and by

this means not only ſpoil and lay open the frontier, but penetrate into the bowels of the kingdom: And that it was in the militia of the barons their anceſtors had placed their chief truſt, for the defence of themſelves againſt a greater power.

By theſe powerful reaſons being made ſenſible of her error, the Queen deſiſted from her demands. Her daughter, Queen Mary, who, as the great hiſtorian ſays, looked upon the moderate government of a limited kingdom, to be diſgraceful to monarchs, and upon the ſlavery of the people, as the freedom of kings, reſolved to have guards about her perſon; but could not fall upon a way to compaſs them: for ſhe could find no pretext, unleſs it were the empty ſhow of magnificence which belongs to a court, and the example of foreign princes; for the former kings had always truſted themſelves to the faith of the barons. At length, upon a falſe and ridiculous pretence, of an intention in a certain nobleman to ſeize her perſon, ſhe aſſumed them; but they were ſoon aboliſhed. Nor had her ſon King James any other guards whilſt he was King of Scotland only, than forty gentlemen: And that

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King declares in the act of parliament, by which they are eſtabliſhed, that he will not burden his people by any tax or impoſition for their maintenance.

Henry the ſeventh, King of England, ſeems to have perceived ſooner, and underſtood better the alteration before-mentioned, than any prince of his time, and obtained ſeveral laws to favour and facilitate it. But his ſucceſſors were altogether improper to ſecond him: for Henry the eighth was an unthinking prince. The reigns of Edward the ſixth, and Queen Mary, were ſhort; and Queen Elizabeth loved her people too well to attempt it. King James, who ſucceeded her, was a ſtranger in England, and of no intereſt abroad. King Charles the firſt did indeed endeavour to make himſelf abſolute, though ſomewhat prepoſterouſly; for he attempted to ſeize the purſe, before he was maſter of the ſword. But very wiſe men have been of opinion, that if he had been poſſeſſed of as numerous guards as thoſe which were afterwards raiſed, and conſtantly kept up by King Charles the ſecond, he might eaſily have ſucceeded in his enterpriſe. For we ſee that in thoſe ſtruggles which

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the country party had with king Charles the ſecond, and in thoſe endeavours they uſed to bring about that revolution which was afterwards compaſſed by a foreign power, the chief and inſuperable difficulty they met with was from thoſe guards. And though king James the ſecond had provoked theſe nations to the laſt degree, and made his own game as hard as poſſible, not only by invading our civil liberties, but likewiſe by eadeavouring to change the eſtabliſhed religion for another which the people abhorred, whereby he loſt their affections, and even thoſe of a great part of his army: Yet notwithſtanding all this miſmanagement, Britain ſtood in need of a foreign force to ſave it; and how dangerous a remedy that is, the hiſtories of all ages can witneſs. 'Tis true, this circumſtance was favourable, that a prince who had married the next heir to theſe kingdoms, was at the head of our deliverance; yet did it engage us in a long and expenſive war. And now that we are much impoveriſhed, and England by means of her former riches and preſent poverty, fallen into all the corruptions which thoſe great enemies of virtue, want, and exceſs of riches

riches can produce; that there are ſuch numbers of mercenary forces on foot at home and abroad; that the greateſt part of the officers have no other way to ſubſiſt; that they are commanded by a wiſe and active king, who has at his diſpoſal the formidable land and ſea forces of a neighboring nation, the great rival of our trade; a king, who by blood, relation, other particular ties, and common intereſt, has the houſe of Auſtria, moſt of the princes of Germany, and potentates of the North, for his friends and allies; who can, whatever intereſt he join with, do what he thinks fit in Europe; I ſay, if a mercenary ſtanding army be kept up, (the firſt of that kind, except thoſe of the uſurper Cromwel, and the late king James, that Britain has ſeen for thirteen hundred years) I deſire to know where the ſecurity of the Britiſh liberties lies, unleſs in the good will and pleaſure of the king; I deſire to know, what real ſecurity can be had againſt ſtanding armies of mercenaries, backed by the corruption of both nations, the tendency of the way of living, the genius of the age, and the examples of the world.

Having

Having ſhewn the difference between the paſt and preſent government of Britain, how precarious our liberties are, and how from having the beſt ſecurity for them we are in hazard of having none at all; 'tis to be hoped that thoſe who are for a ſtanding army, and loſing no occaſion of advancing and extending the prerogative, from a miſtaken opinion that they eſtabliſh the antient government of theſe nations, will ſee what ſort of patriots they are.

But we are told, that only ſtanding mercenary forces can defend Britain from the perpetual ſtanding armies of France. However frivolous this aſſertion be, as indeed no good argument can be brought to ſupport it, either from reaſon or experience, as ſhall be proved hereafter; yet allowing it to be good, what ſecurity can the nations have that theſe ſtanding forces ſhall not at ſome time or other be made uſe of to ſuppreſs the liberties of the people, though not in this king's time, to whom we owe their preſervation. For I hope there is no man ſo weak to think, that keeping up the army for a year, or for any longer time than the parliaments of both nations ſhall have engaged the publick

faith to make good all deficiencies of funds granted for their maintenance, is not the keeping them up for ever. 'Tis a pitiful ſhift in the undertakers for a ſtanding army, to ſay, We are not for a ſtanding army; we are only for an army from year to year, or till the militia be made uſeful. For Britain cannot be in any hazard from France; at leaſt till that kingdom, ſo much exhauſted by war and perſecution, ſhall have a breathing ſpace to recover. Before that time our militias will be in order; and in the mean time the fleet. Beſides, no prince ever ſurrendered ſo great countries and ſo many ſtrong places, I ſhall not ſay in order to make a new war; but as theſe men will have it, to continue the ſame. The French king is old and diſeaſed, and was never willing to hazard much by any bold attempt. If he, or the dauphin, upon his deceaſe, may be ſuſpected of any farther deſign, it muſt be upon the Spaniſh monarchy, in caſe of the death of that king. And if it be objected, that we ſhall ſtand in need of an army, in ſuch a conjuncture; I anſwer, that our part in that, or in any other foreign war, will be beſt managed by ſea, as ſhall be ſhewn hereafter.

Let

Let us then ſee if mercenary armies be not exactly calculated to enſlave a nation. Which I think may be eaſily proved, if we conſider that ſuch troops are generally compoſed of men who make a trade of war; and having little or no patrimony, or ſpent what they once had, enter into that employment in hopes of its continuance during life, not at all thinking how to make themſelves capable of any other. By which means heavy and perpetual taxes muſt be entailed for ever upon the people for their ſubſiſtence; and ſince all their relations ſtand engaged to ſupport their intereſt, let all men judge, if this will not prove a very united and formidable party in a nation.

But the undertakers muſt pardon me if I tell them, that no well-conſtituted government ever ſuffered any ſuch men in it, whoſe intereſt leads them to imbroil the ſtate in war, and are a uſeleſs and inſupportable burden in time of peace. Venice or Holland are neither of them examples to prove the contrary; for had not their ſituation been different from that of other countries, their liberty had not continued to this time. And they ſuffer no forces to

remain within thoſe inacceſſible places which are the chief ſeats of their power. Carthage, that had not thoſe advantages of ſituation, and yet uſed mercenary forces, was brought to the brink of ruin by them in a time of peace, beaten in three wars, and at laſt ſubdued by the Romans. If ever any government ſtood in need of ſuch a ſort of men, 'twas that of antient Rome, becauſe they were engaged in perpetual war. The argument can never be ſo ſtrong in any other caſe. But the Romans, well knowing ſuch men and liberty to be incompatible, and yet being under a neceſſity of having armies conſtantly on foot, made frequent changes of the men that ſerved in them; who, when they had been ſome time in the army, were permitted to return to their poſſeſſions, trades, or other employments. And to ſhew how true a judgment that wiſe ſtate made of this matter, it is ſufficient to obſerve, that thoſe who ſubverted that government, the greateſt that ever was amongſt men, found themſelves obliged to continue the ſame ſoldiers always in conſtant pay and ſervice.

If during the late war we had followed ſo wiſe a courſe as that of Rome, there had been thrice as many trained men in the

nations

nations as at preſent there are; no difficulties about recruits, nor debates about keeping up armies in time of peace, becauſe ſome men reſolve to live by arms in time of peace, whether it be for the good of the nations or not. And ſince ſuch was the practice of Rome, I hope no man will have the confidence to ſay, that this method was not as effectual for war as any other. If it be objected that Rome had perpetual wars, and therefore that might be a good practice among them, which would not be ſo with us; I confeſs I cannot ſee the conſequence; for if Rome had perpetual wars, the Romans ought ſtill to have continued the ſame men in their armies, that they might, according to the notion of theſe men, render their troops more uſeful. And if we did change our men during a war, we ſhould have more men that would underſtand ſomething of it. If any man ſay, Not ſo much as if they continued in the army: I anſwer, that many of thoſe who continue in the army, are afterwards ſwept away by the war, and live not to be of uſe in time of peace; that thoſe who eſcape the war, being fewer than in the other caſe, are ſoon conſumed: and

that mercenary ſtanding forces in time of peace, if not employed to do miſchief, ſoon become like thoſe of Holland in 72, fit only to loſe forty ſtrong places in forty days.

There is another thing which I would not mention if it were not abſolutely neceſſary to my preſent purpoſe; and that is, the uſual manners of thoſe who are engaged in mercenary armies. I ſpeak now of officers in other parts of Europe, and not of thoſe in our armies, allowing them to be the beſt; and, if they will have it ſo, quite different from all others. I will not apply to them any part of what I ſhall ſay concerning the reſt. They themſelves beſt know how far any thing of that nature may be applicable to them. I ſay then, moſt princes of Europe having put themſelves upon the foot of keeping up forces, rather numerous than well entertained, can give but ſmall allowance to officers, and that likewiſe is for the moſt part very ill paid, in order to render them the more neceſſitous and depending; and yet they permit them to live in all that extravagance which mutual example and emulation prompts them to. By which means the officers become inſenſibly engaged in numberleſs

berleſs frauds, oppreſſions and cruelties, the colonels againſt the captains, and the captains againſt the inferior ſoldiers; and all of them againſt all perſons with whom they have any kind of buſineſs. So that there is hardly any ſort of men who are leſs men of honour than the officers of mercenary forces: and indeed honour has now no other ſignification amongſt them than courage. Beſides, moſt men that enter into thoſe armies, whether officers or ſoldiers, as if they were obliged to ſhew themſelves new creatures, and perfectly regenerate, if before they were modeſt or ſober, immediately turn themſelves to all manner of debauchery and wickedneſs, committing all kind of injuſtice and barbarity againſt poor and defenceleſs people. Now tho' the natural temper of our men be more juſt and honeſt than that of the French, or of any other people, yet may it not be feared, that ſuch bad manners may prove contagious? And if ſuch manners do not fit men to enſlave a nation, devils only muſt do it. On the other hand, if it ſhould happen that the officers of ſtanding armies in Britain

tain ſhould live with greater regularity and modeſty than was ever yet ſeen in that ſort of men, it might very probably fall out, that being quartered in all parts of the country, ſome of them might be returned members of parliament for divers of the electing boroughs; and of what conſequence that would be, I leave all men to judge. So that whatever be the conduct of a mercenary army, we can never be ſecure as long as any ſuch force is kept up in Britain.

But the undertakers for a ſtanding army will ſay; Will you turn ſo many gentlemen to ſtarve, who have faithfully ſerved the government? This queſtion I allow to be founded upon ſome reaſon. For it ought to be acknowledged in juſtice to our ſoldiery, that on all occaſions, and in all actions, both officers and ſoldiers have done their part; and therefore I think it may be reaſonable, that all officers and ſoldiers of above forty years, in conſideration of their unfitneſs to apply themſelves at that age to any other employment, ſhould be recommended to the bounty of both parliaments.

I confeſs I do not ſee by what rules of good policy any mercenary forces have been connived at either in Scotland, England, or Ireland. Sure, 'tis allowing the diſpenſing power in the moſt eſſential point of the conſtitution of government in theſe nations.

Scotland and England are nations that were formerly very jealous of liberty; of which there are many remarkable inſtances in the hiſtories of theſe countries. And we may hope that the late revolution having given ſuch a blow to arbitrary power in theſe kingdoms, they will be very careful to preſerve their rights and privileges. And ſure it is not very ſuitable to theſe, that any ſtanding forces be kept up in Britain: or that there ſhould be any Scots, Engliſh, or Iriſh regiments maintained in Ireland, or any where abroad; or regiments of any nation at the charge of England. I ſhall not ſay how readily the regiments that were in the ſervice of Holland came over againſt the duke of Monmouth: He was a rebel, and did not ſucceed. But we all know with what expedition the Iriſh mercenary forces were brought into Britain

to oppoſe his preſent majeſty in that glorious enterprize for our deliverance.

The ſubjects formerly had a real ſecurity for their liberty, by having the ſword in their own hands. That ſecurity, which is the greateſt of all others, is loſt; and not only ſo, but the ſword is put into the hand of the king by his power over the militia. All this is not enough; but we muſt have in both kingdoms ſtanding armies of mercenaries, who for the moſt part have no other way to ſubſiſt, and conſequently are capable to execute any commands: and yet every man muſt think his liberties as ſafe as ever, under pain of being thought diſaffected to the monarchy. But ſure it muſt not be the antient limited and legal monarchies of Scotland, and England, that theſe gentlemen mean. It muſt be a French faſhion of monarchy, where the king has power to do what he pleaſes, and the people no ſecurity for any thing they poſſeſs. We have quitted our antient ſecurity, and put the militia into the power of the king. The only remaining ſecurity we have is, that no ſtanding armies were ever yet allowed in time of peace, the parliament of England having ſo often and ſo expreſsly

expreſsly declared them to be contrary to law: and that of Scotland having not only declared them to be a grievance, but made the keeping them up an article of the forfeiture of the late King James. If a ſtanding army be allowed, what difference will there be between the government we ſhall then live under, and any kind of government under a good prince? Of which there have been ſome in the moſt deſpotick tyrannies. If theſe be limited and not abſolute monarchies, then, as there are conditions, ſo there ought to be ſecurities on both ſides. The barons never pretended that their militia's ſhould be conſtantly on foot, and together in bodies in times of peace. 'Tis evident that would have ſubverted the conſtitution, and made every one of them a petty tyrant. And 'tis as evident, that ſtanding forces are the fitteſt inſtruments to make a tyrant. Whoever is for making the king's power too great or too little, is an enemy to the monarchy. But to give him ſtanding armies, puts his power beyond controul, and conſequently makes him abſolute. If the people had any other real ſecurity for their liberty than that there be no ſtanding armies in time of peace, there might be ſome colour to demand

them. But if that only remaining ſecurity be taken away from the people, we have deſtroyed theſe monarchies.

'Tis pretended, we are in hazard of being invaded by a powerful enemy; ſhall we therefore deſtroy our government? What is it then that we would defend? Is it our perſons, by the ruin of our government? In what then ſhall we be gainers? In ſaving our lives by the loſs of our liberties? If our pleaſures and luxury make us live like brutes, it ſeems we muſt not pretend to reaſon any better than they. I would fain know, if there be any other way of making a prince abſolute, than by allowing him a ſtanding army: if by it all princes have not been made abſolute; if without it, any. Whether our enemies ſhall conquer us is uncertain; but whether ſtanding armies will enſlave us, neither reaſon nor experience will ſuffer us to doubt. 'Tis therefore evident, that no pretence of danger from abroad can be an argument to keep up ſtanding armies, or any mercenary forces.

Let us now conſider whether we may not be able to defend ourſelves by well-regulated militias againſt any foreign force, though

though never ſo formidable: that theſe nations may be free from the fears of invaſion from abroad, as well as from the danger of ſlavery at home.

After the barons had loſt the military ſervice of their vaſſals, militias of ſome kind or other were eſtabliſhed in moſt parts of Europe. But the prince having every where the power of naming and preferring the officers of theſe militias, they could be no balance in government, as the former were. And he that will conſider what has been ſaid in this diſcourſe, will eaſily perceive that the eſſential quality requiſite to ſuch a militia, as might fully anſwer the ends of the former, muſt be, that the officers ſhould be named and preferred, as well as they and the ſoldiers paid, by the people that ſet them out. So that if princes look upon the preſent militias as not capable of defending a nation againſt foreign armies, the people have little reaſon to entruſt them with the defence of their liberties.

And though upon the diſſolution of that antient militia under the barons, which made theſe nations ſo great and glorious, by ſetting up militias generally through

Europe, the ſword came not into the hands of the commons, which was the only thing could have continued the former balance of government, but was every-where put into the hands of the king: Nevertheleſs ambitious princes, who aimed at abſolute power, thinking they could never uſe it effectually to that end, unleſs it were weilded by mercenaries, and men that had no other intereſt in the commonwealth than their pay, have ſtill endeavoured by all means to diſcredit militias, and render them burdenſome to the people, by never ſuffering them to be upon any right, or ſo much as tolerable foot, and all to perſuade the neceſſity of ſtanding forces. And indeed they have ſucceeded too well in this deſign: For the greateſt part of the world has been fool'd into an opinion, that a militia cannot be made ſerviceable. I ſhall not ſay 'twas only militias could conquer the world; and that princes, to have ſucceeded fully in the deſign before-mentioned, muſt have deſtroyed all the hiſtory and memory of antient governments, where the accounts of ſo many excellent models of militia are yet extant. I know the prejudice and ignorance of the world concern-

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ing the art of war, as it was practiſed by the antients; though what remains of that knowledge of their writings be ſufficient to give a mean opinion of the modern diſcipline. For this reaſon I ſhall examine, by what has paſſed of late years in theſe nations, whether experience have convinced us, that officers bred in foreign wars, be ſo far preferable to others who have been under no other diſcipline than that of an ordinary and ill-regulated militia; and if the commonalty of both kingdoms, at their firſt entrance upon ſervice, be not as capable of a reſolute military action, as any ſtanding forces. This doubt will be fully reſolved, by conſidering the actions of the marquis of Montroſe, which may be compared, all circumſtances conſidered, with thoſe of Cæſar, as well for the military ſkill, as the bad tendency of them; though the marquis had never ſerved abroad, nor ſeen any action, before the ſix victories, which, with numbers much inferiour to thoſe of his enemies, he obtained in one year; and the moſt conſiderable of them were chiefly gained by the aſſiſtance of the tenants and vaſſals of the family of Gordon. The battle of Naſeby will be a farther

ther illuſtration of this matter, which is generally thought to have been the deciding action of the late civil war. The number of forces was equal on both ſides; nor was there any advantage in the ground, or extraordinary accident that happened during the fight, which could be of conſiderable importance to either. In the army of the parliament, nine only of the officers had ſerved abroad, and moſt of the ſoldiers were prentices drawn out of London but two months before. In the king's army there were above a thouſand officers that had ſerved in foreign parts: Yet was that army routed and broken by thoſe new-raiſed prentices; who were obſerved to be obedient to command, and brave in fight; not only in that action, but on all occaſions during that active campaign. The people of theſe nations are not a daſtardly crew, like thoſe born in miſery under oppreſſion and ſlavery, who muſt have time to rub off that fear, cowardice and ſtupidity which they bring from home. And though officers ſeem to ſtand in more need of experience than private ſoldiers; yet in that battle it was ſeen, that the ſobriety and principle of the officers on the one ſide, prevailed

vailed over the experience of thoſe on the other.

'Tis well known that divers regiments of our army, lately in Flanders, have never been once in action, and not one half of them above thrice, nor any of them five times during the whole war. O, but they have been under diſcipline, and accuſtomed to obey! And ſo may men in militias. We have had to do with an enemy, who, tho' abounding in numbers of excellent officers, yet durſt never fight us without a viſible advantage. Is that enemy like to invade us, when he muſt be unavoidably neceſſitated to put all to hazard in ten days, or ſtarve?

A good militia is of ſuch importance to a nation, that it is the chief part of the conſtitution of any free government. For though as to other things, the conſtitution be never ſo ſlight, a good militia will always preſerve the publick liberty. But in the beſt conſtitution that ever was, as to all other parts of government, if the militia be not upon a right foot, the liberty of that people muſt periſh. The militia of antient Rome, the beſt that ever was in any government, made her miſtreſs of the

world: But ſtanding armies enſlaved that great people, and their excellent militia and freedom periſhed together. The Lacedemonians continued eight hundred years free, and in great honour, becauſe they had a good militia. The Swiſſes at this day are the freeſt, happieſt, and the people of all Europe who can beſt defend themſelves, becauſe they have the beſt militia.

I have ſhewn that liberty in the monarchical governments of Europe, ſubſiſted ſo long as the militia of the barons was on foot: And that on the decay of their militia, (which though it was none of the beſt, ſo it was none of the worſt) ſtanding forces and tyranny have been every where introduced, unleſs in Britain and Ireland; which by reaſon of their ſituation, having the ſea for frontier, and a powerful fleet to protect them, could afford no pretence for ſuch forces. And though any militia, however ſlightly conſtituted, be ſufficient for that reaſon to defend us; yet all improvements in the conſtitution of militias being further ſecurities for the liberty of the people, I think we ought to endeavour the amendment of them, and till that can take place, to make the preſent mi-

litias uſeful in the former and ordinary methods.

That the whole free people of any nation ought to be exerciſed to arms, not only the example of our anceſtors, as appears by the acts of parliament made in both kingdoms to that purpoſe; and that of the wiſeſt governments among the antients; but the advantage of chuſing out of great numbers, ſeems clearly to demonſtrate. For in countries where huſbandry, trade, manufactures, and other mechanical arts are carried on, even in time of war, the impediments of men are ſo many and ſo various, that unleſs the whole people be exerciſed, no conſiderable numbers of men can be drawn out, without diſturbing thoſe employments, which are the vitals of the political body. Beſides, that upon great defeats, and under extreme calamities, from which no government was ever exempted, every nation ſtands in need of all the people, as the antients ſometimes did of their ſlaves. And I cannot ſee, why arms ſhould be denied to any man who is not a ſlave, ſince they are the only true badges of liberty; and ought never, but

in times of utmoſt neceſſity, to be put into the hands of mercenaries or ſlaves: neither can I underſtand, why any man that has arms, ſhould not be taught the uſe of them.

By the conſtitution of the preſent militia in both nations, there is but a ſmall number of the men able to bear arms exerciſed; and men of quality and eſtate are allowed to ſend any wretched ſervant in their place: ſo that they themſelves are become mean, by being diſuſed to handle arms; and will not learn the uſe of them, becauſe they are aſhamed of their ignorance: by which means the militias being compoſed only of ſervants, theſe nations ſeem altogether unfit to defend themſelves, and ſtanding forces to be neceſſary. Now can it be ſuppoſed that a few ſervants will fight for the defence of their maſters eſtates, if their maſters only look on? or that ſome inconſiderate freeholders, as for the moſt part thoſe who command the militia are, ſhould, at the head of thoſe ſervants, expoſe their lives for men of more plentiful eſtates, without being aſſiſted by them? No bodies of military men can be of any force or value, unleſs many perſons of quality

quality or education be among them; and ſuch men ſhould bluſh to think of excuſing themſelves from ſerving their country, at leaſt for ſome years, in a military capacity, if they conſider that every Roman was obliged to ſpend fifteen years of his life in their armies. Is it not a ſhame that any man who poſſeſſes an eſtate, and is at the ſame time healthful and young, ſhould not fit himſelf by all means for the defence of that, and his country, rather than to pay taxes to maintain a mercenary, who tho' he may defend him during a war, will be ſure to inſult and enſlave him in time of peace. Men muſt not think that any country can be in a conſtant poſture of defence, without ſome trouble and charge; but certainly 'tis better to undergo this, and to preſerve our liberty with honour, than to be ſubjected to heavy taxes, and yet have it inſolently raviſhed from us, to our preſent oppreſſion, and the laſting miſery of our poſterity. But it will be ſaid, Where are the men to be found who ſhall exerciſe all theſe people in ſo many ſeveral places at once? for the nobility and gentry know nothing of the matter; and to hire ſo many ſoldiers of fortune, as they

call

call them, will be chargeable, and may be dangerous, theſe men being all mercenaries, and always the ſame men, in the ſame truſts: Beſides that the employing ſuch men would not be ſuitable to the deſign of breeding the men of quality and eſtate to command, as well as the others to obey.

To obviate theſe difficulties; and becauſe the want of a good model of militia, and a right method of training people in time of peace, ſo as they need not apprehend any war, though never ſo ſudden, is at this day the bane of the liberty of Europe, I ſhall propoſe one, accommodated to the invincible difficulty of bringing men of quality and eſtate, or men of any rank, who have paſſed the time of youth, to the uſe of arms; and new, becauſe though we have many excellent models of militia delivered to us by ancient authors, with reſpect to the uſe of them in time of war, yet they give us but little information concerning the methods by which they trained their whole people for war in time of peace; ſo that if the model which I ſhall propoſe, have not the authority of the antients to recommend it, yet perhaps by a ſevere

a ſevere diſcipline, and a right method of diſpoſing the minds of men, as well as forming their bodies, for military and virtuous actions, it may have ſome reſemblance of their excellent inſtitutions.

What I would offer is, that four camps be formed, one in Scotland, and three in England; into which all the young men of the reſpective countries ſhould enter, on the firſt day of the two and twentieth year of their age; and remain there the ſpace of two years, if they be of fortunes ſufficient to maintain themſelves; but if they are not, then to remain a year only at the expence of the publick. In this camp they ſhould be taught the uſe of all ſorts of arms, with the neceſſary evolutions; as alſo wreſtling, leaping, ſwimming, and the like exerciſes. He whoſe condition would permit him to buy and maintain a horſe, ſhould be obliged ſo to do, and be taught to vault, to ride, and to manage his own horſe. This camp ſhould ſeldom remain above eight days in one place, but remove from heath to heath; not only upon the account of cleanlineſs and health, but to teach the youth to fortify a camp, to march, and to accuſtom them (reſpect being always had

had to thoſe of a weak conſtitution) to carry as much in their march as ever any Roman ſoldier did; that is to ſay, their tents, proviſion, arms, armour, their utenſils, and the paliſadoes of their camp. They ſhould be taught to forage, and be obliged to uſe the countrymen with all juſtice in their bargain, for that and all other things they ſtand in need of from them. The food of every man within the camp ſhould be the ſame; for bread they ſhould have only wheat, which they are to be obliged to grind with hand-mills; they ſhould have ſome ſalt, and a certain number of beeves allowed them at certain times of the year. Their drink ſhould be water, ſometimes tempered with a proportion of brandy, and at other times with vinegar. Their cloaths ſhould be plain, coarſe, and of a faſhion fitted in every thing for the fatigue of a camp. For all theſe things thoſe who could ſhould pay, and thoſe who could not, ſhould be defrayed by the publick, as has been ſaid. The camp ſhould be ſometimes divided into two parts, which ſhould remove from each other many miles, and ſhould break up again at the ſame time, in order to meet upon

upon ſome mountainous, marſhy, woody, or, in a word, croſs ground; that not only their diligence, patience, and ſufferings in marches, but their ſkill in ſeizing of grounds, poſting bodies of horſe and foot, and advancing towards each other; their chuſing a camp, and drawing out of it in order to a battle, might be ſeen, as well as what orders of battle they would form upon the variety of different grounds. The perſons of quality or eſtate ſhould likewiſe be inſtructed in fortification, and gunnery, all things belonging to the duty of an engineer: and forts ſhould be ſometimes built by the whole camp, where all the arts of attacking and defending places ſhould be practiſed. The youth having been taught to read at ſchools, ſhould be obliged to read at ſpare hours ſome excellent hiſtories, but chiefly thoſe in which military actions are beſt deſcribed; with the books that have been beſt written concerning the military art. Speeches exhorting to military and virtuous actions ſhould be often compoſed, and pronounced publickly by ſuch of the youth as were, by education and natural talents, qualified for it. There being none but military men allowed within the camp, and no churchmen being of that number, ſuch of the

youth as may be fit to exhort the reſt to all chriſtian and moral duties, chiefly to humility, modeſty, charity, and the pardoning of private injuries, ſhould be choſen to do it every Sunday, and the reſt of that day ſpent in reading books, and in converſation directed to the ſame end. And all this under ſo ſevere and rigorous orders, attended with ſo exact an execution by reward and puniſhment, that no officer within the camp ſhould have the power of pardoning the one, or with-holding the other. The rewards ſhould be all honorary, and contrived to ſuit the nature of the different good qualities and degrees in which any of the youth had ſhewn, either his modeſty, obedience, patience in ſuffering, temperance, diligence, addreſs, invention, judgment, temper, or valour. The puniſhments ſhould be much more rigorous than thoſe inflicted for the ſame crimes by the law of the land. And there ſhould be puniſhments for ſome things not liable to any by the common law, immodeſt and inſolent words or actions, gaming, and the like. No woman ſhould be ſuffered to come within the camp, and the crimes of abuſing their own bodies, any

manner

manner of way, puniſhed with death. All theſe things to be judged by their own councils of war; and thoſe councils to have for rule, certain articles drawn up and approved by the reſpective parliaments. The officers and maſters, for inſtructing and teaching the youth, in all the exerciſes above-mentioned, ſhould upon the firſt eſtabliſhment of ſuch a camp, be the moſt expert men in thoſe diſciplines; and brought by encouragements from all places of Europe; due care being taken that they ſhould not infect the youth with foreign manners. But afterwards they ought to conſiſt of ſuch men of quality or fortune as ſhould be choſen for that end, out of thoſe who had formerly paſt two years in the camp, and ſince that time had improved themſelves in the wars; who upon their return ſhould be obliged to ſerve two years in that ſtation. As for the numbers of thoſe officers, or maſters; their ſeveral duties; that of the camp-maſter-general, and of the commiſſaries; the times and manner of exerciſe, with divers other particulars of leſs conſideration, and yet neceſſary to be determined, in order to put ſuch a deſign in execution, for brevity's ſake I omit them, as eaſy to

be reſolved. But certainly it were no hard matter, for men that had paſſed through ſuch diſcipline as that of the camp I have deſcribed, to retain it after they ſhould return to their ſeveral homes; if the people of every town and village, together with thoſe of the adjacent habitations, were obliged to meet fifty times in the year, on ſuch days as ſhould be found moſt convenient; and exerciſe four hours every time: for all men being inſtructed in what they are to do; and the men of quality and eſtate moſt knowing and expert of all others, the exerciſe might be performed in great perfection. There might alſo be yearly in the ſummer time, a camp of ſome thouſands of the neareſt neighbours brought and kept together for a week to do thoſe exerciſes, which cannot be performed in any other place: every man of a certain eſtate being obliged to keep a horſe fit for the war. By this means it would be eaſy upon any occaſion, though never ſo ſmall (as, for example, the keeping of the peace, and putting the laws in execution where force is neceſſary) or never ſo great and ſudden (as upon account of invaſions and conſpiracies) to bring together ſuch numbers

numbers of officers and ſoldiers as the exigence required, according to the practice of antient Rome; which in this particular might be imitated by us without difficulty: and if ſuch a method were once eſtabliſhed, there would be no neceſſity of keeping up a militia formed into regiments of foot and horſe in time of peace. Now if this militia ſhould ſtand in need of any farther improvement (becauſe no militias ſeem comparable to thoſe exerciſed in actual war; as that of the barons, by their conſtant feuds; and that of Rome, and ſome other antient common-wealths, by their perpetual wars) a certain ſmall number of forces might be employed in any foreign country where there ſhould be action; a fourth part of which might be changed every year; that all thoſe who had in this manner acquired experience, might be diſperſed among the ſeveral regiments of any army, that the defence of theſe countries ſhould at any time call for; which would ſerve to confirm and give aſſurance to the reſt. Such a militia would be of no great expence to theſe nations; for the mean cloathing and proviſions for thoſe who could

could not maintain themſelves, being given only for one year, would amount to little; and no other expence would be needful, except for their arms, a ſmall train of artillery for each camp, and what is to be given for the encouragement of the firſt officers and maſters.

A militia upon ſuch a foot, would have none of the infinite and inſuperable difficulties there are, to bring a few men, who live at a great diſtance from one another, frequently together to exerciſe; at which conſequently they muſt be from home every time ſeveral days: of finding ſuch a number of maſters, as are neceſſary to train ſo many thouſands of people ignorant of all exerciſe, in ſo many different places, and for the moſt part at the ſame time: it would have none of thoſe innumerable incumbrances, and unneceſſary expences, with which a militia formed into regiments of foot and horſe in time of peace is attended. In ſuch a camp the youth would not only be taught the exerciſe of a muſket with a few evolutions, which is all that men in ordinary militias pretend to, and is the leaſt part of the duty of a ſoldier; but

beſides

beſides a great many exerciſes to ſtrengthen and diſpoſe the body for fight, they would learn to fence, to ride, and manage a horſe for the war; to forage and live in a camp; to fortify, attack, and defend any place; and what is no leſs neceſſary, to undergo the greateſt toils, and to give obedience to the ſevereſt orders. Such a militia, by ſending beyond ſeas certain proportions of it, and relieving them from time to time, would enable us to aſſiſt our allies more powerfully than by ſtanding armies we could ever do. Such a camp would take away the great difficulty of bringing men of all conditions, who have paſſed the time of their youth, to apply themſelves to the uſe and exerciſe of arms; and beginning with them early, when like wax they may be moulded into any ſhape, would diſpoſe them to place their greateſt honour in the performance of thoſe exerciſes, and inſpire them with the fires of military glory, to which that age is ſo inclined; which impreſſion being made upon their youth, would laſt as long as life. Such a camp would be as great a ſchool of virtue as of military diſcipline: in which the youth would learn to ſtand in need of

few things; to be content with that ſmall allowance which nature requires; to ſuffer, as well as to act; to be modeſt, as well as brave; to be as much aſhamed of doing any thing inſolent or injurious, as of turning their back upon an enemy; they would learn to forgive injuries done to themſelves, but to embrace with joy the occaſions of dying to revenge thoſe done to their country: and virtue imbibed in younger years would caſt a flavour to the utmoſt periods of life. In a word, they would learn greater and better things than the military art, and more neceſſary too, if any thing can be more neceſſary than the defence of our country. Such a militia might not only defend a people living in an iſland, but even ſuch as are placed in the midſt of the moſt warlike nations of the world.

Now till ſuch a militia may be brought to ſome perfection, our preſent militia is not only ſufficient to defend us; but conſidering the circumſtances of the French affairs, eſpecially with relation to Spain, Britain cannot juſtly apprehend an invaſion, if the fleet of England, to which Scotland furniſhed during the late war ſeven or eight thouſand ſeamen, were in ſuch order

as

as it ought to be. And it can never be the intereſt of theſe nations to take any other ſhare in preſerving the balance of Europe, than what may be performed by our fleet. By which means our money will be ſpent amongſt ourſelves; our trade preſerved to ſupport the charge of the navy; our enemies totally driven out of the ſea, and great numbers of their forces diverted from oppoſing the armies of our allies abroad, to the defence of their own coaſts.

If this method had been taken in the late war, I preſume it would have proved, not only more advantagious to us, but alſo more ſerviceable to our allies than that which was followed. And 'tis in vain to ſay, that at this rate we ſhall have no allies at all: for the weaker party on the continent muſt be contented to accept our aſſiſtance in the manner we think fit to give it, or inevitably periſh. But if we ſend any forces beyond the ſeas to join thoſe of our allies, they ought to be part of our militia, as has been ſaid, and not ſtanding forces; otherwiſe, at the end of every war, the preſent ſtruggle will recur, and at one time or other theſe nations will be betrayed, and a ſtanding army eſtabliſhed: ſo that

nothing can ſave us from following the fate of all the other kingdoms in Europe, but putting our truſt altogether in our fleet and militias, and having no other forces than theſe. The ſea is the only empire which can naturally belong to us. Cogqueſt is not our intereſt, much leſs to conſume our people and treaſure in conquering for others.

To conclude; if we ſeriouſly conſider the happy condition of theſe nations, who have lived ſo long under the bleſſings of liberty, we cannot but be affected with the moſt tender compaſſion to think that the Scots, who have for ſo many ages, with ſuch reſolution, defended their liberty againſt the Picts, Britons, Romans, Saxons, Danes, Iriſh, Normans, and Engliſh, as well as againſt the violence and tyranny of ſo many of their own princes; that the Engliſh, who, whatever revolutions their country has been ſuject to, have ſtill maintained their rights and liberties againſt all attempts; who poſſeſs a country, every where cultivated and improved by the induſtry of rich huſbandmen; her rivers and harbours filled with ſhips; her cities, towns, and villages, enriched with manufactures;

factures; where men of vaſt eſtates live in ſecure poſſeſſion of them, and whoſe merchants live in as great ſplendor as the nobility of other nations: that Scotland, which has a gentry born to excel in arts and arms: that England which has a commonalty not only ſurpaſſing all thoſe of that degree which the world can now boaſt of, but alſo all thoſe of all former ages, in courage, honeſty, good ſenſe, induſtry, and generoſity of temper; in whoſe very looks there are ſuch viſible marks of a free and liberal education; which advantages cannot be imputed to the climate, or to any other cauſe, but the freedom of the government under which they live: I ſay, it cannot but make the hearts of all honeſt men bleed to think, that in their days the felicity and liberties of ſuch countries muſt come to a period, if the parliaments do not prevent it, and his Majeſty be not prevailed upon to layaſide the thoughts of mercenary armies, which, if once eſtabliſhed, will inevitably produce thoſe fatal conſequences that have always attended ſuch forces in the other kingdoms of Europe; violation of property, decay of trade, oppreſſion of the country by heavy taxes and

quarters, the utmoſt miſery and ſlavery of the poorer ſort, the ruin of the nobility by their expences in court and army, deceit and treachery in all ranks of men, occaſioned by want and neceſſity. Then ſhall we ſee the gentry of Scotland ignorant through want of education, and cowardly by being oppreſſed; then ſhall we ſee the once happy commonalty of England become baſe and abject, by being continually expoſed to the brutal inſolence of the ſoldiers; the women debauched by their luſt; ugly and naſty through poverty, and the want of things neceſſary to preſerve their natural beauty. Then ſhall we ſee that great city, the pride and glory, not only of our iſland, but of the world, ſubjected to the exceſſive impoſitions Paris now lies under, and reduced to a pedling trade, ſerving only to foment the luxury of a court. Then will Britain know what obligations ſhe has to thoſe who are for mercenary armies.

MVSEVM BRITANNICVM

FINIS.